The conflict and Western sanctions have harmed Russia’s economy, however Moscow is trying to reduce the impact of sanctions by promoting domestic production. Ukraine’s reliance on Western armaments allows Western powers to influence how Kyiv plans its approach. Ammunition factories across Europe have ramped up production to replenish national stockpiles which have been supplied as military aid to Ukraine. It is unclear whether Ukraine’s need for artillery ammunition can be handled by the West if the war continues to drag on.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2014, following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, initially focused on the status of Crimea and the Donbas, internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. The first eight years of the conflict included the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the war in Donbas (2014–present), and naval incidents in the Black Sea.
On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its largest military operation since World War II. The invasion has caused Europe’s largest refugee crisis since World War II, with more than 8 million Ukrainians fleeing the country and a third of the population displaced.
The conflict has had a significant impact on the global economy, causing energy prices to rise and disrupting supply chains. It has also led to increased tensions between Russia and the West, with the United States and its allies imposing sanctions on Russia.
The global economy has also been affected by the Russia-Ukraine war. Energy prices have risen, and there have been disruptions to supply chains. The war has also led to increased tensions between Russia and the West, which could hurt global trade.
The economic impact of the Russia-Ukraine war is still unfolding. It is too early to say what the long-term impact will be. However, the war has had a significant impact on the global economy, and it is likely to continue to do so for some time to come.
According to the European Central Bank, Energy inflation was by far the most prominent source of inflation in 2022, while food inflation has recently contributed the most. Food prices climbed 14.1% in January 2023 compared to the previous year. Because food production requires a lot of energy, the high rates of food inflation are a result of the indirect and delayed impacts of high energy costs, which the conflict has exacerbated. High inflation, a big percentage of which is accounted for by energy and food, continues to have a considerable detrimental influence on many aspects of our economy and people’s daily lives.
The Russia-Ukraine war has had a significant economic impact on both countries, as well as on the global economy.
The Ukrainian economy has experience turbulent times due to the war. The country’s GDP contracted by 29.1% in 2022, and it is expected to contract by another 10% in 2023. The war has also caused widespread damage to infrastructure, and it has disrupted trade and investment.
The Russian economy has also been affected by the war but to a lesser extent than Ukraine’s economy. The Russian GDP contracted by 2.1% in 2022, and it is expected to contract by another 0.5-0.8% in 2023. The war has led to economic sanctions from the West, which have further hurt the Russian economy.
Here are some of the specific economic impacts of the war:
Russia is a major exporter of oil and gas, and the war has disrupted supply chains. This has led to higher energy prices, which have harmed businesses and consumers around the world. The war has disrupted trade between Russia and Ukraine, and it has also had a knock-on effect on other countries. This has led to shortages of goods and materials, which has caused prices to rise. The war has created uncertainty about the future, and this has led to a decline in investment. This will harm economic growth in the long term. The combination of higher energy prices and disrupted supply chains has led to inflation rising in many countries. This is putting a squeeze on household incomes and businesses. The economic impact of the war is likely to be felt for some time to come. It is important to monitor the situation closely and to take steps to mitigate the impact of the war on the global economy.
Critical Raw Materials
According to the OECD, Russia produces 5.5% of the world’s aluminum, 11% of the world’s nickel, and 15% of the world’s nickel exports. 43% of the world’s palladium output and 21% of its exports come from Russia. Several nations, including Japan (43%), the United States (37%), the United Kingdom (30.5%), China (28.5%), Italy (26%), Germany (21%), and Korea (20%), rely heavily on Russia for their imports of palladium.
Vanadium oxides are mostly exported from four countries: South Africa, Brazil, China, and Russia. Russia produces 21% of the world’s vanadium oxides and exports 25% of the total amount. The Czech Republic is most dependent on Russian imports, accounting for 88% of all imports from Russia. Vanadium oxide imports from Russia are also significant to China (31%) and India (21%). Russia produces 18% of the world’s potash and exports 14.5% of it, while Belarus (via the state-owned Belaruskali company) produces 17% of the world’s potash and sends out 19.7% of it, bringing the proportion of global production and exports impacted by the Ukrainian crisis to 35% and 34.2%, respectively.
In February 2022, nickel and aluminum prices surpassed their previous peaks. The price of potash increased by about 80% in February 2022 compared to the prior months, it reached an unusually noticeable peak. Since January 2022, vanadium and palladium prices have experienced strong increases. Ferrovanadium prices have risen gradually, rising by 50% since the beginning of the conflict.
Combat Proven Platforms In Ukraine – Russia Conflict
The list of advanced weapons supplied by the West to Ukraine includes HIMARS, Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB), Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS), M109, AS90, CAESAR, PzH2000, Krab, Zuzana 24 and Archer self-propelled artillery units, M777 and M119 wheeled artillery, M113, Marder, Bulldog, Bradley and Stryker armored vehicles, Challenger 2 and Leopard 2 MBTs, NASAMS and IRIS-T air defense systems, German Gepard anti-aircraft cannons, Harpoon anti-ship missiles and shore-based launchers, M982 Excalibur – Precision-guided artillery shell, BONUS, and SMArt 155 rounds and HARM anti-radiation missiles.
Loitering munitions proved to be effective in the battle by enabling troops to assault high-tech and pricey weapon systems used by the Ukrainian military, such as radars or long-range artillery. On March 4, the open-source intelligence (OSINT) organization Oryx reported that Russian kamikaze drone attacks on Ukrainian targets had resulted in at least 100 successful hits. The current model, also known as “Product 52,” or the Lancet-3M, weighs around 15 kg and travels at a speed of about 70 miles per hour. The vehicle speeds and dives at 190 mph to strike with a five-kilogram armor-piercing warhead after the operator has used a camera in the nose to seek and identify targets. Targets are often found by a reconnaissance drone before a Lancet is launched, and the maximum range is reported to be 25 miles.
Ukraine received hundreds of Switchblade systems from the US. Switchblade is a tiny flying drone that weighs only 5.55 pounds and gets its name from its folding wings. It may be remotely piloted and released into the air through a two-foot launch tube. Once there, it can be directed to dive toward enemy personnel and detonate a small grenade-like charge, spraying shotgun fragments in that direction.
Both Ukrainian and Russian forces now regularly surround howitzers and other weaponry with metal netting to prevent loitering ammunition from striking expensive equipment.
The continuous counteroffensive operations by forces against are hitting obstacles because of highly developed electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, according to a daily update from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). These actions by soldiers are seen as the beginning of a comprehensive counteroffensive. According to reports, these strategies are used to obstruct radio transmission and impede the employment of precision-guided weapons, greatly affecting how clashes turn out.
A contemporary electronic warfare system called the Murmansk BN was created by the Russian company KRET. The system, which was created as a component of a Russian strategic electronic warfare system and functions as a network-centric capability, is intended to jam long-range communications. The Russian army started using the jamming system in 2014. The system’s main function is to block High Frequency (HF) transmissions from NATO forces, especially from the HF Global Communications System of the United States (HFGCS) and high-frequency military satellite communications. A key component of Russia’s strategic EW supplement is the Krasukha-4. The Krasukha-4, which targets higher-frequency X- and Ku-band fire control radars, is frequently deployed alongside the Krasukha-2, which jams lower-frequency S-band search radars. Leer-3, RB-341V can be effective across hundreds of kilometers, it interferes with VHF and UHF communications, including cellular and military radios. The RH-330Zh Zhitel Jammer can disable satellite and GPS communications over a wide area.
Shoulder Fired Missiles
Shoulder fired missiles have been a weapon of choice for both sides to annihilate land platforms. Javelin and Kornet have been used extensively in this conflict.
The Javelin is a “fire-and-forget” weapon, it is also called as shoot and scoot, due to operability of this weapon. This was especially critical in the early days of the war because Russians tended to enter cities in columns. A Javelin operator could fire from behind a building or from behind a tree and be gone before the Russians could respond. The Javelin is also effective at attacking the Russian tanks’ weak point, their horizontal surfaces because its trajectory after launch causes it to curve upwards before hitting the target from above.
The Kornet, which is equipped with semi-automatic command-to-line-of-sight (SACLOS) laser guidance, can engage a target head-on in a direct attack profile. Kornet missiles use shaped charge HEAT warheads to effectively destroy MBTs equipped with ERA or other high explosive warheads. The Kornet also has a day/night thermal sight with zoom capability, which may magnify targets to a greater extent than the Javelin ATGM counterpart. The Kornet is available in both infantry portable and vehicle-mounted configurations. The anti-tank missile has already been fitted into a BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle.
Ukraine has received around 150-160 M-777 155-millimeter (mm) towed howitzers from the United States. Other countries sent limited quantities from their stocks. Ukraine has received around 300 pieces of 155 mm towed and self-propelled artillery in total. Ukraine has acquired at least 72 105 mm howitzers 36 from the US, 36 L119 howitzers36 from the UK, and a few older M101 howitzers, around 36 from Lithuania. The M-777 is no longer in production. Although the Army may restart M-777 manufacture, new systems would take many years to arrive. Instead, the US has begun to supply a 105 mm howitzer, the M119, and a tracked 155 mm howitzer, the M109.
The leading Russian artillery systems are the 2S19 Msta-S SPG, and the Tornado Multiple Rocket Launch System (MLRS). They are used to destroy Ukraine’s 122mm D-30 howitzer, D-20 howitzer, Gvozdika SPG, 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzer, US-made M777 lightweight howitzer, command posts, and troop concentrations.
The much-improved Russian SPG, 2S19M2 or 2S33 Msta-SM2, is now in production and is fitted with a new automatic fire-control system that boosts the rate of fire to 10 rounds per minute. Digital electronic maps are now available, which considerably improve terrain orientation in challenging geographical settings and enable faster and more efficient firing missions. The new 2A79 152 mm/L60 ordnance for the 2S33 Msta-SM2 howitzer has enhanced ballistics. It has a higher breech pressure and can fire ammunition with more propellant charges than the original 2S19 Msta-S. The gun is longer and heavier in weight. As a result, it has a greater firing range.
The Orlan-10 is a medium-range, multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) created in St Petersburg by the Russian corporation Special Technology Center LLC (еиалн енолоиески ентp). The UAV is in service with the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense. The fixed-wing drones primarily utilize cameras and sensors to correct artillery barrages and monitor for enemy activity, however, the aircraft have been seen launching several bomblets from pods beneath their wings. The UAV has a modular design with a high-wing shape, as well as a tailplane and a vertical stabilizer. It has a 3.1m wingspan and a 2m aerodynamic fuselage. The UAV’s empty weight and maximum take-off weight are 12.5kg and 16.5kg, respectively. A collapsible catapult is used to launch the drone, and a parachute landing system is used to recover it.
Orion-E is a long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle designed for day and night aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in a variety of climate zones. The aircraft’s radar signal is reduced by eliminating radar-catching right angles, and its short 16-meter wingspan is narrow enough to increase fuel efficiency for a flight time of up to 24 hours. Its potent Electronic Counter Measures (ECMs) can be used to impair enemy communications and navigation systems, while its astonishing assortment of missiles and bombs can be unleashed with deadly impact. Furthermore, the drone’s internal Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) system enables it to recognize and identify targets in real-time.
Bayraktar TB 2
The Bayraktar TB2, created and constructed by the Turkish defense company Baykar, is the size of a small airplane and is equipped with laser-guided missiles. The drone is capable of both reconnaissance and strike missions. The TB2 contains a triple-redundant flight control system that allows for autonomous taxi, takeoff, cruise, landing, and parking. The key component is the computerized flight control system, which performs sensor fusion algorithms using real-time sensor data. The mission control computer system handles mission-specific controls.
End Of Conflict?
NATO leaders have stated that Ukraine should be allowed to join the military alliance in the future, but have not extended an urgent invitation to Kyiv.
Ukraine feels that joining NATO is the only way to avoid future Russian attacks on it, but the US and other alliance members are concerned that allowing Ukraine to join in the future may be regarded as a hostile move by Moscow. Western officials, on the other hand, continue to emphasize various types of continuous assistance for Ukraine. While the battle continues, the G7 main countries, including the UK, will agree to a framework of long-term security arrangements geared at ensuring long-term arms supply and economic support to Ukraine.
The move by NATO has been seen as a possible immediate step to end the ongoing conflicts in this region. It is also notable that important stake holders in this conflict have mentioned that the conflict would end in July- August 2023.
Moreover, with lack of replenishment of Western weapon systems for Ukraine and no specific reason for Russia to continue the war, it is only logical for both sides to stop the ongoing conflict.